ABSTRACT OF PAPER
Title: The valuation of individual decision and welfare: A Humean perspective
Author: Lapidus André
As economists, we are used to consider as consistent (i) the valuation of individual welfare upon which, for instance, a social welfare function might be built, and (ii) individual preferences, as represented by a function of utility. Although this is a long-standing way of thinking, which dates back to Bentham, this paper aims at showing that a more qualified position might be found in the works of David Hume: In the Treatise, the Enquiries, and the Essays, Hume leads us to distinguish between the valuation of decision and the one of welfare. On the one hand, the valuation of decision comes from Hume’s theory of passions, and allows a measure of desire through the sensation of pleasure and the strength of the correlate idea, that is, of belief. On the other hand, the valuation of welfare is divided into interest and happiness. ‘Interest’ is mentioned in Bk II of the Treatise, and, on first view, seems to depend solely on the sensation of pleasure. ‘Happiness’ as a goal for human behaviour is noticed in the second Enquiry, but its content cannot be made clear without the help of some of Hume’s Essays. It is linked not only to pleasure as a sensation, but also to a special property of passions: their degree of violence. It is argued in this paper that according to Hume, a convergence between decision and welfare, that is, between desire, interest, and happiness, cannot be obtained but under the grip of ‘calm’ passions.
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